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James C. Hathaway *
Harmonizing for Whom? The
Devaluation of Refugee Protection
in the Era of European
Economic Integration
The pursuit of enhanced economic integration within Europe poses a
threat to both the substance and the processes of the international sys-
tem of refugee protection. In substantive terms, European Community
governments have seized upon the impending termination of immigra-
tion controls at intra-Community borders to demand enhanced security
at the Community's external frontiers. Fearful that a continuing com-
mitment to refugee protection threatens the viability of a union pre-
mised on external closure, states have taken the facile approach of
elaborating a policy of generalized deterrence: all persons seeking entry
from less developed states-whether or not they have a valid claim to
refugee status-will be stigmatized as potential threats to European
communal well-being, and their prospects for ingress consequently con-
strained. Under the guise of "harmonization", European governments
have effectively renounced their commitment to an inter-regional system
of asylum.
Equally ominous is the decision-making process from which this
common policy of deterrence has emerged, for it breaks with the tradi-
tion of elaborating norms of refugee law in an open and politically
accountable context. Collaborating within a covert network of intergov-
ernmental decision-making bodies spawned by the economic integration
process itself, governments have dedicated themselves to the avoidance
of national, international, and supranational scrutiny grounded in the
human rights standards inherent in refugee law. This dangerous prece-
dent represents a serious constriction of the modest opportunities tradi-
tionally available within the international community to advocate for
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principled limitations on the scope of purely self-interested policy-
making.
I. European Integration as the Pretext for Deterrence
Regional economic integration has not caused the diminished commit-
ment to refugees within Europe; rather, the heightened restrictionism is
a reflection of the fact that Europeans have come to see "foreigners"' as
threats to regional stability2 and security.3 There is a pervasive belief
that the cultural and racial heterogeneity4 which accompanies immigra-
tion jeopardizes European identity5 and solidarity. 6 There is concern
that immigrants will neither adjust to nor be accepted within European
society, 7 and that they will offer unwelcome competition for scarce jobs
and housing.8 Governments have sustained this popular xenophobia, 9
1. "To a great extent the distinction between refugees, illegal immigrants, drug
traffickers and terrorists has become blurred in the public mind and they are all seen
to be problems which can only be resolved by stricter border controls." Gil Loe-
scher, The European Community and Refugees, 65 INT'L AFFAIRS 617, 624 (1989).
2. "The healthy feeling that binds together the societies of Europe's nation-
states now seems to be breeding something far from healthy, a mindless intolerance
of outsiders." Europe's Immigrants: Strangers Inside the Gates, THE EcONOMisT, Feb. 15,
1992, at 21.
3. Jonas Widgren, International Migration and Regional Stability, 66(4) INT'L
AFFAIRS 749, 749 (1990).
4. [W]hat concerns policy-makers more is the kind of asylum-seeker who is
appearing at their borders, and the fact that his arrival is totally unregulated.
Many of the 'new' refugees originate in the Third World, whereas in the past
there were few large-scale spontaneous arrivals from distant countries.
Loescher, supra note 1, at 619. Accord J.Y. Carlier, Harmonisation des politiques d'asile des
pays d'Europe: Les enjeuxjuridiques, Conference paper, COLLOQUE DE L'O.F.P.R.A.,June
1992, at 2. Compare with the reaction to Eastern European migrants: "Rightly or
wrongly, the Community is less in a panic over immigrants from the east. They are,
after all, fellow Europeans, often with useful skills to offer and many of them anyway
likely to return home when economic circumstances permit." THE ECONOMIST, June
1, 1991, cited in Third World Migrants and Refugees in the 'Common European Home,' 18
North/South Issues 6 (1992).
5. "Despite the move toward an integrated Europe, the citizens of the EC want
to retain their culture and nationality." E. Whitaker, The Schengen Agreement and Its
Portent for the Freedom of Personal Movement in Europe, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 191, 214
(1992).
6. "The interplay of numerical importance and foreign origin does not permit
European countries to regard with equanimity a situation which breeds social ten-
sions, nurtures festering ethnic conflicts and saps democratic traditions and free-
doms." W. R. B6hning, Integration and Immigration Pressures in Western Europe, 130(4)
INT'L LABOUR REV. 445, 450 (1991).
7. Unlike the East Europeans, many of the new asylum-seekers have arrived
without readily transferable skills. This, combined with their different race
and their alien religions, is seen as posing extremely difficult social and polit-
ical problems both now and in the future. In the face of this perceived threat,
xenophobic and racist attitudes are increasingly obvious among some seg-
ments of the Western public.
Loescher, supra note 1, at 623.
8. Bbhning, supra note 6, at 449. But cf. DANIELEJOLY & CLIVE NETrLETON, REF-
UGEES IN EUROPE 13 (1990): "Economic recession and unemployment have often
been put forward as an explanation for this [restrictionist] trend, but by itself it does
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at times even stooping to the blatant racism of former French premier
Jacques Chirac's claim that the "noise and smell" of Arab and black
immigrants were driving French workers crazy.' 0
Pandering to this combination of protectionist and racist fears,
states have ended most opportunities for immigration. I  Not even the
traditional exception in favor of "temporary" workers has survived, 12
since economic restructuring has dramatically reduced the perceived
value of unskilled labor.' 3 The termination of most labor-based immi-
gration has put real pressure on the asylum process, now the only legal
mechanism to come to Europe available to most foreigners. 14 As an
unwelcome "loophole" in the European closure program,' 5 refugee
protection has thus attracted the negative scrutiny of those involved in
the elaboration of the regional economic integration process. 16
not seem a sufficient explanation: Norway became one of the strictest countries for
asylum-seekers ... at a time when there was practically no unemployment."
9. "European electorates expect their governments to maintain a tough immi-
gration policy, and that is very difficult to combine with a generous asylum policy."
Edward Mortimer, Behind Closed Doors, FIN. TMES, Oct. 28, 1992, at 21.
10. The Guardian, June 28, 1991, cited in S. Egan & A. Storey, European Asylum
Policy: A Fortress Under Construction, TR6CAIRE DEVELOPMENT REvIEw 49, 55 (1992).
11. "The desire to preserve a unique, national culture goes a long way to explain-
ing why the majority of countries in Western Europe did not establish immigrant
policies which integrated immigrants into society as a whole, but rather treated immi-
grants as temporary residents." Whitaker, supra note 5, at 215.
12. Now that the asylum procedure is being used by a growing number of
economic migrants to circumvent the various restrictive measures which the
European countries have introduced since the first oil crisis in order to stop
permanent immigration for employment purposes, the right of asylum is
viewed against the backdrop of the immigration question.
Discussion Paper on the Right of Asylum, Commission of the European Communi-
ties, annex to Doc. SEC(91)1857, Oct. 11, 1991, at 3.
13. The realization in industrialized European states of the... imminent need
to restructure industry to make it more competitive with Japan and the
United States, induced these states to scale down schemes for recruiting for-
eign workers .... Traditional markets for unskilled foreign labour are shrink-
ing in all the world's economic growth centres.
Widgren, supra note 3, at 753-54. Accord B6hning, supra note 6, at 454.
14. C'est que, i l'6vidence, lorsque les portes sont ferm6es et que les circon-
stances imposent de trouver abri, on entre par les fentres. Ce n'est pas dire
uniquement que de nombreux requ6rants d'asile nejustifient pas de craintes
avec raison de pers6cution. C'est dire aussi qu'ant6rieurement, alors qu'ils
pouvaient entrer par les portes d'immigration de travail, ils n'avaient nul
besoin de grimper l'6chelle, pour p6n6trer les fentres, d'une proc6dure
complexe de reconaissance de la qualit6 de r6fugi6, avec les cons6quences
que cela peut entainer au regard des proches demeur6s au pays d'origine.
Carlier, supra note 4, at 2.
15. "Many Western governments now perceive asylum applications to be a
smokescreen for the 'economic migration' which they had attempted to end." Egan
& Storey, supra note 10, at 51.
16. But even bonafide fugitives can reach unmanageable numbers, or at least
numbers that exceed the compassion and hospitality of the resident popula-
tion. In Germany that point has been reached .... Sadly, a tougher asylum
policy is bound to [evolve], and it will have to be a European policy if other
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H. Development and Evolution of the Deterrent Regime
A cornerstone of the evolving union within Europe is the elimination of
internal barriers to freedom of movement. 17 The 1957 Treaty of
Rome's provisions on freedom of movement within the Community for
workers' s are to be extended to all EC citizens under the 1986 Single
European Act' 9 and the proposed Maastricht Treaty on European
Unity. 20 While states have thus far refused to cede sovereignty over
immigration law to the European Community,2 ' nonetheless they have
recognized that the ending of internal border controls makes effective
exercise of dejure national competence over immigration nearly impossi-
ble:2 2 once an individual has successfully entered the common territory,
he or she is unlikely to be inspected again. 23 Governments have as a
result sought agreement on common criteria to regulate the entry of
foreigners into the Community.24
EC members wish to retain free movement for their own nationals in and out
of the German market.
Mortimer, supra note 9.
17. See, e.g., Loescher, supra note 1, at 617.
18. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, art. 3(c) [hereinaf-
ter EEC Treaty).
19. Article 8A amended the Treaty of Rome to establish "an area without internal
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is
ensured" by not later than December 31, 1992. Regulation 1612/68 requires equal-
ity of treatment for EC nationals in member states other than their own in regard to
eligibility for employment, tax and social benefits, and family reunion.
20. Under Article 8, the concept of citizenship in the European Union is estab-
lished, and every citizen of the Union is granted the right to move and reside freely
within the territory of any of the member states. The target date for the elimination
of all internal border checks is nowJanuary 1995. Ronald Kaye, British Refugee Policy
and 1992: The Breakdown of a Policy Community, 5(1) J. REFUGEE STUD. 47, 57 (1992).
Upon ratification by all EC states, association agreements with Poland and Hungary
will allow freedom of movement for their nationals into the EC. Similar arrange-
ments are under negotiation with the Czech and Slovak Republics. IMMIGRATION
LAW PRACTITIONERS' AsSOCIATION, UPDATE: JANUARY 1993, at 2.
21. The conflict between the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act,
on the one hand, and the goal of an integrated Europe, on the other, stems
from the fact that the Treaties allow each country to continue its immigration
policy, but the goal of an integrated Europe would seem to require a com-
mon immigration policy to ensure freedom of movement of all persons
within the EC.
Whitaker, supra note 5, at 196.
22. "Member States have realized that completion of the internal market already
necessitates, and establishment of political union certainly will necessitate, harmoni-
zation of the formal (organization, length of procedures and means of redress) and
substantive aspects of the right of asylum." Communication from the Commission to
the Council and the European Parliament on the Right of Asylum, Commission of the
European Communities, Doc. SEC(91)1857, Oct. 11, 1991, at 4.
23. "Freedom of movement is a threat to the security of each of the nations in the
Schengen group because once someone is in Schengenland, legally or illegally, they
will not be inspected again." Whitaker, supra note 5, at 219. See also B6hning, supra
note 6, at 451-52.
24. Carlier, supra note 4, at 2.
Vol. 26
1993 Devaluation of Refugee Protection
The substance of the consensus is devastating for refugees. 2 5 Gov-
ernments have decided to treat migrants from the less developed world
as an undifferentiated evil: refugees, economic migrants, drug traffick-
ers, and terrorists are officially categorized as presenting a unified
threat,26 and will all confront a common policy of deterrence. 2 7 States
have elaborated an absolutely blunt legal response to the alleged men-
ace of "foreigners" which effectively buries any concern for the human
rights principles of international refugee law.28 In the end, refugees will
be treated as presumptively unworthy of protection.2 9
The first guiding principle of the coordinated approach is the duty
systematically to impose visa requirements on the nationals of most
migrant-generating, less developed countries, and to enforce this policy
by sanctioning carriers which transport asylum seekers and others not in
possession of the requisite visa.30 This is an almost complete barrier to
access, since even if refugees are able safely to access a European consu-
lar authority in their state of origin, no visa will be issued to an individ-
ual for the purpose of making a claim to protection in Europe. 31
25. "While it is important that governments are able to remove clearly fraudulent
asylum applications from the process as swiftly as possible, an asylum policy based
solely on an accelerating process of control and deterrence throughout the Commu-
nity weakens refugee protection." Loescher, supra note 1, at 631.
26. The origin of this association of concerns derives from the work of the inter-
governmental Trevi group (discussed infra notes 76-100 accompanying text), which
was charged with the examination of asylum issues in the context of broader discus-
sions of violence, international terrorism, and drug trafficking. "Maastricht ...
retains the dangerous practice of associating asylum and immigration issues with
criminality: the articles dealing with asylum policy also refer to 'combatting terror-
ism, unlawful drug trafficking and other serious forms of international crime.'" 18
North/South Issues 3 (1992).
27. Joly & Nettleton, supra note 8, at 2 1.
28. "Malgr6 le rappel des engagements internationaux, certaines mesures prises
actuellement, tant dans les mesures d'harmonisation que par les Etats, portent
atteinte i la premiere 6tape des droits de l'exilL celle de quitter son pays." Carlier,
supra note 4, at 6.
29. See, e.g., Widgren, supra note 3, at 751:
The process of establishing the internal market is already leading EC states to
foresee potential migratory pressures from outside the Community, exacer-
bated by the present influx of illegal migrants and asylum seekers from devel-
oping countries, many of whom lack valid refugee claims, i.e. are refugees
from poverty rather than persecution.
30. As part of the process for achieving the single internal market within the
European Community (EC) ... the member states are making arrangements
to cooperate systematically with each other in imposing visa requirements on
nationals of the same countries and sanctions on transport operators which
carry people-including asylum seekers-not in possession of the required
visas or travel documents.
Amnesty International, Europe: Harmonization of asylum policy: Amnesty International's
concerns at i (1990). See, e.g., Schengen Agreement (1990), at art. 26(2); and the draft
Convention on the Crossing of External Borders, Doc. SN 2528/91 (WGI 822),June
24, 1991, at art. 14(2).
31. But see Kay Hailbronner's argument that as a companion piece to the current
harmonization legislation in Europe, asylum seekers should be given the opportunity
to. claim an entry visa which permits them to seek asylum in one of the contracting
states. Kay Hailbronner, M6glichkeiten und Grenzen einer europaischen Koordiniernng des
Cornell International Law Journal
Only states which accept this obligation to block the entry3 2 of
"undesirable" national groups will, in return, see their own citizens
granted unrestricted freedom of movement within the Community. For
example, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece were required to adopt
stringent visa and other external border controls 3 3 as a condition prece-
dent to being allowed to accede to the Schengen Agreements.3 4 Similar
requirements are found in both the proposed Maastricht Treaty 5 and
the draft Convention on the Crossing of External Borders.3 6 Effectively,
those European states which have traditionally allowed foreigners to
make their case for admission at a domestic port of entry will now have
to choose between the continuation of that policy and the extension to
their nationals of unrestricted regional freedom of movement.3 7 In the
current xenophobic environment, there is little domestic political advan-
tage to championing the rights of foreigners.
Visa requirements and carrier sanctions are crude instruments
which bar genuine refugees from exercising their right to seek asylum.
As noted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
"While such measures are targeted at foreigners in general, in the case
Einreise-und Asylrechts: Ihre Auswirkungen auf des Asyirecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland
(1989), abstracted at 4(1) INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 126 (1992).
32. "The [Schengen] Convention compels the States to refuse entry... quite a
new phenomenon in aliens law. Generally, a refusal takes place only after the inter-
ests of the alien and the general interest of the State concerned have been balanced."
J. Steenbergen, Schengen and the Movement of Persons, in SCHENGEN: INTERNATIONALISA-
TION OF CENTRAL CHAPTERS OF THE LAW ON ALIENS, REFUGEES, PRIVACY, SECURITY
AND THE POLICE 65 (H. Meijers et al., 1991).
33. The northern countries, which have long since closed their gates, are now
looking nervously at their Mediterranean partners, relatively unaccustomed,
except for France, to heavy immigration. They fear that illegal migrants, hav-
ing slipped into, say, Portugal or Spain, will be unchecked all the way to the
North Sea. So the southerners have been hurriedly installing the parapher-
nalia of immigration control.
Europe's Immigrants, supra note 2, at 21-22.
34. Whitaker, supra note 5, at 197-99.
35. The proposed Article 100(c) allows for Community control of the common
visa policy, while Article K.1 defines both asylum policy and the rules governing
crossing of external frontiers to be matters of Community interest.
36. The Member States undertake to harmonize their visa policies progres-
sively. Pending such harmonization, the Member States shall agree, by the
entry into force of this Convention at the latest, on the countries for which
there exist common visa arrangements. These arrangements, as part of a
common visa policy, determine for each of the countries whether or not its
nationals are subject to the visa requirement.
Convention of the Member States of the European Communities on the Crossing of Their External
Borders, AD Hoc GROUP IMMIGRATION, Doc. SN 2528/91 (WGI 822),June 24, 1991, at
art. 17.
37. "Les candidats devraient convaincre les membres du groupe Schengen de
leur d&ermination i ouevrer pour la construction europ~enne .. .La structure
Schengen est ne de Ia crainte de voir la mise en oeuvre du programme com-
munautaire provoquer un d~ficit de s~curit&" Phillipe Weckel, La Convention Addi-
tionelle d l'Accord de Schengen, REVUE G9NERAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 403, 429
(1991).
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of asylum-seekers they tended to increase the risk of refoulement."'38 Most
perniciously, the mechanism for the enforcement of these generic visa
requirements falls wholly outside the realm of legal accountability:
Forcing carriers to verify visas and other travel documentation helps to
shift the burden of determining the need for protection to those whose
motivation is to avoid monetary penalties on their corporate employer,
rather than to provide protection to individuals. In so doing, it contrib-
utes to placing this very important responsibility in the hands of those (a)
unauthorized to make asylum determinations on behalf of States, (b)
thoroughly untrained in the nuances and procedures of refugee and asy-
lum principles, and (c) motivated by economic rather than humanitarian
considerations. Inquiry into whether the absence of valid documentation
may evidence the need for immediate protection of the traveller is never
reached. 3 9
These "migration-hampering policies" are tough and explicitly discrimi-
natory,40 and violate the most basic rationale for the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees. 4 ' Indeed, by blackmailing other
states to comply with deterrent measures by conditioning access to
regional freedom of movement of Europeans, the Schengen Agreements
and their progeny arguably induce a violation of international law.
4 2
The second substantive aspect of the evolving European policy on
asylum is the denial to those refugees who manage successfully to evade
overseas deterrence of their right to choose the state in which they will
seek protection. 4 3 In most cases, it is the country which either issued
38. U.N. Doc. E/1992/65 (1992), at 30.
39. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Position on Con-
ventions Recently Concluded in Europe (Dublin and Schengen Conventions), Aug.
16, 1991, at 5.
40. Widgren, supra note 3, at 762-64.
41. "Although carrier sanctions are not necessarily contrary to international law,
UNHCR is particularly concerned about the imposition of carrier sanctions and strict
visa requirements which do not distinguish asylum-seekers from other aliens."
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 39, at 5. See also Egan &
Storey, supra note 10, at 61; INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL COM-
MrrrEE ON THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, Restrictive Measures in Europe 21 (1992).
42. Schengen II and Dublin contain rules on the requirement of visa and on
the imposition of penalties on carriers who transport aliens without posses-
sion of the requisite travel documents. Although these provisions do not
appear to be contrary to Articles 33 and 31 of the 1951 Convention when
taken literally, they are, however, contrary to the 1951 Convention as a
whole.
INTERNATIONAL LAw ASSOCIATION, supra note 41, at 21. See also Carlier, supra note 4,
at 6.
43. The intentions of the asylum-seeker as regards the country in which he
wishes to request asylum should as far as possible be taken into account.
Regard should be had to the concept that asylum should not be refused
solely on the ground that it could be sought from another state. Where, how-
ever, it appears that a person, before requesting asylum, already has a con-
nection or close links with another State, he may if it appears fair and
reasonable be called upon first to request asylum from that State.
Conclusion 15(XXX) of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Pro-
gramme, at para. (h)(iii)-(iv), U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/2/Eng./REV.1986 (1979). Seegener-
ally JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 46-50 (1991).
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the refugee claimant a visa or in which the claimant first arrived which
will now be required to consider the claim to asylum, provide protection
if warranted, and remove unrecognized claimants from the continent.4 4
The refugee has no right to continue her or his initial journey towards a
different European state, nor to move on within the region after an
adverse determination. 4 5 This policy clearly bolsters the mechanisms of
external deterrence,4 6 in that it imposes a particularized duty on any
state which fails adequately to fend off the inflow of refugees, genuine or
not.
For the refugee, the consequences of this regime are serious.
Because there is no procedural or substantive harmonization of affirma-
tive norms of refugee law in Europe, recognition rates for persons with
comparable claims differ quite significantly from country to country. 4 7
The prevailing policy in Europe, elaborated in both the Schengen
Agreements and Dublin Convention, takes no account of these critical
variations. 48 It is rather assumed that the treatment a refugee claimant
receives in one contracting state can reasonably be taken as discharging
the duty of all other participating governments. This position is in
direct conflict with the international legal duty of each state indepen-
dently to implement its obligations under the Refugee Convention. 49
44. The procedures summarized here are those established by the two accords
agreed to in June 1990: first, the Convention Determining the State Responsible for
Examining Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the
European Communities ("Dublin Convention"), at arts. 4-8; and second, the Con-
vention on the Application of the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 relating to
the Gradual Suppression of Controls at Commons Frontiers, between the Govern-
ments of States Members of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of
Germany and the French Republic ("Schengen II"), at art. 30. Regarding the com-
patibility of these two accords, see INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, supra note 41, at
7.
45. "Since a sole state is deemed responsible for handling a request for asylum,
the freedom of choice of the asylum-seekers is radically reduced. They cannot
choose a country with more liberal laws. The will of the state has usurped the will of
the individual." Tom Casey, Europe 1992-Closing the Doors, (Spring 1991] STUDIES
48, 52.
46. "UNHCR is concerned where the emphasis on this 'authorization principle'
has the effect of causing States to strengthen even further both their entry require-
ments (visa arrangements), and their mechanisms to enforce these requirements (air-
line sanctions)." United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 39, at
4.
47. Amnesty International, Europe: Human Rights and the Need for a Fair Asylum Pol-
icy 12-15 (1991); Hailbronner, supra note 31, at 126; United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, supra note 39, at 3.
48. "The EC Commission and some governments, notably the Dutch, would like
to see a greater level of policy harmonisation in the future, but other governments
fear that harmonisation might involve a dilution of their present restrictive stances."
18 North/South Issues 3 (1992). Accord Weckel, supra note 37, at 414.
49. [S]trict assignment of responsibilities on the basis of which State author-
ized entry could lead to rejection of individual claims which, in another State
party, might have been recognized .... Since the [Schengen and Dublin]
Conventions' provisions for informal consultation between States should not
be a substitute for adherence to international obligations (non-refoulement,
etc.) UNHCR has a role to play in assisting States to achieve consistency and
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Because of the economic integration program, there will likely be a
decline in the overall level of openness,50 since no state "will want to
attract more than its fair share of asylum applicants by appearing to be
too liberal in its admissions policy."' 5 1 This tone was set by the docu-
ment prepared by the Ad Hoc Group Immigration for the 1991 Maas-
tricht Summit, which identified "substantive harmonization" as a key
element of the proposed refugee work program.5 2 However, in actually
defining the content of this initiative, the Ad Hoc Group recommended
that priority attention be given to the grounds for excluding refugees
through common policies on manifestly unfounded claims, the principle
of first host country, and country condition assessment. Attention to
interpretation of the Refugee Convention ranked as only its fourth (and
last) substantive goal.5 3 Rallying to this agenda, the December 1992
meeting of EC immigration ministers was indeed able to reach consen-
sus on the appropriateness of "fast track" procedures to reject the
claims of persons who it is judged ought to have sought an internal
flight alternative, or who can be removed to a non-European "host third
country." 54 It also provided for the outright exclusion from the deter-
mination process of those who come from a country "in which there is
generally no serious risk of persecution," individual circumstances
complementarity between the requirements of regional and of international
refugee instruments.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, supra note 39, at 3-4. It is particu-
larly noteworthy that the Dutch Council of State advised against ratification of the
"Schengen II" Agreement on the ground that Dutch authorities might be acting in
violation of international law were they to require a claimant to have his or her case
heard in a jurisdiction with a less adequate protection regime.
50. There was, after all, a logical tendency to seek asylum in countries which
were considered to have the most generous admissions policy, and it was
feared that the resultant pressure on the countries concerned would cause
them to adopt a more restrictive policy. If the flow of asylum seekers was
then diverted to countries with-relatively speaking-more liberal admis-
sions policies, pressure would then shift to those countries. It seemed that a
downward spiral might be set in motion, not because of any general change
in attitude towards the asylum issue, but solely as a result of individual coun-
tries' fears that a relatively tolerant policy might create a pull factor.
Dutch Advisory Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy, Harmonization of
Asylum Law in Western Europe 13. See also Casey, supra note 45, at 54; INTERNATIONAL
LAW AssOCIATION, supra note 41, at 18.
51. Loescher, supra note 1, at 629.
52. "As for the tasks to be performed, priority would appear to go to preparing
implementation of the Dublin Convention and harmonizing the substantive rules of
asylum law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of the Geneva Convention."
Ad Hoc Group Immigration, "Report from the Ministers responsible for immigration
to the European Council meeting in Maastricht on immigration and asylum policy",
Doc. SN 4038/91 (WGI 930), Dec. 3, 1991, at 4.
53. Id. at 8.
54. Resolution on a Harmonized Approach to Questions Concerning Host Third Countries,
AD Hoc GROUP IMMIGRATION Doc. SN4823/92 (WGI 1283), Nov. 19, 1992; Resolution
on Manifestly Unfounded Applications for Asylum, AD Hoc GROUP IMMIGRATION Doc.
SN4822/1/92 (WGI 1282), Dec. 2, 1992.
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notwithstanding.5 5 The portrait which emerges is of commitment to
accelerated control and deterrence,5 6 in which the unification of exter-
nal frontier security jurisdiction not yet formally achieved in Community
law is obtained defacto as an integral step in the establishment of free-
dom of movement within Europe. 57
M. The Avoidance of Human Rights-Based Scrutiny
International refugee law is not the product of an unadulterated human-
itarian or human rights vision. Rather, it is fundamentally an attempt to
reconcile the dominant intention of states to control entry into their ter-
ritories with the human reality of coerced migrations. Therefore, while
refugee law falls significantly short of recognizing the right to migrate of
all victims of human rights abuse, it nonetheless requires that states
employ the rubric of human rights law in their scrutiny of the risks faced
by those who claim protection.58 How is it that the evolving European
regime has managed to distance itself so fundamentally from this human
rights context in an apparently single-minded pursuit of deterrence?5 9
The primary regional site for discussion of refugee law issues was
55. Conclusions on Countries in Which There is Generally No Serious Risk of Persecution, AD
Hoc GROUP IMMIGRATION Doc. SN4821/92 (WGI 1281), Nov. 18, 1992. See generally
Jacqueline Bhabha, Harmonization of European Immigration Law, 70(2) Interpreter
Releases 49, 55-57 (1993); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EUROPE: HARMONIZATION OF
ASYLUM POLICY: ACCELERATED PROCEDURES FOR "MANIFESTLY UNFOUNDED" ASYLUM
CLAIMS AND THE "SAFE COUNTRY" CONCEPT, Nov. 1992.
56. "Les projets actuels se contentent de mettre 'accent sur les contr6les
procfduraux i l'entrfe, au risque de vider la procbdure de reconnaissance de la qual-
it6 de r~fugi6 de tout contenu, d'une part parce qu'il n'est pas possible pour le
rbfugi6 d'acc6der i la procedure s'il ne peut acceder au territoire d'un Etat d'accueil,
d'autre part parce que cette procedure n'emporterait pas r6frence i une interpr6ta-
tion commune de la notion de r~fugi&" Carlier, supra note 4, at 8. Accord Loescher,
supra note 1, at 631.
57. "[L]a Convention de Schengen 6l6ve au plan europ~en la preoccupation de
l'ordre public qui demeure 6trangre au droit communautaire." Weckel, supra note
37, at 436.
58. See, e.g., Jack Garvey, Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law, 26
HARV. INT'L L.J. 483, 500; G. Coles, Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 407-10 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds.,
1989); and James C. Hathaway, Reconceiving Refugee Law as Human Rights Protection,
4(2)J. REFUGEE STUD. 113 (1991). Indeed, the Committee on Population and Refu-
gees of the Council of Europe recommended that
the concept of persecution should be interpreted and applied liberally and
also adapted to the changed circumstances which may differ considerably
from those existing when the Convention was originally adopted . . .[A]ccount should be taken of the relation between refugee status and the
denial of human rights as laid down in different international instruments.
J. Thomas, Refugees: A New Dimension in International Human Rights, 70 A.S.I.L.P. 58, 69
(A. Woods ed., 1976).
59. "So far, the Member States and the Commission have looked at the question
of the right of asylum solely from the point of view of the completion of the internal
market." Commission of the European Communities, supra note 12, at 9.
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initially the Council of Europe, 60 the body with main responsibility for
administration of human rights law in Europe.6 1 The early refugee-
related work of the Council is faithful to its human rights mission,6 2
including resolutions in 197663 and 198164 calling for procedural and
substantive harmonization of refugee law. With the reconstruction of
refugee flows as an aspect of the drive towards -European freedom of
movement, the locus for debate on asylum policy shifted during the mid-
1980s to the public organs of the European Community. 65 Like the
Council of Europe, the European Parliament embraced a largely human-
itarian vision of refugee law, and had the temerity to pass resolutions
which focused on the rights of refugees and explicitly condemned visa
requirements that impede access to protection.6 6 Governments
responded by denying that the EC had any competence in the field of
asylum law, and that requisite coordination of refugee policy would be
60. Of particular significance is the work of the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on
the Legal Aspects of Refugees (CAHAR). See generally Loescher, supra note 1, at 628-
29.
61. [L]'insertion du droit d'asile dans le cadre du Conseil de 'Europe permet-
trait rutilisation des m~canismes de protection mis en place par la Conven-
tion europ6ene de sauvegarde des droits de 'homme et des libert~s
fondamentales. Diverses propositions en vue d'ajouter i la convention un
protocole sur le droit d'asile one 6t6 faites.
Carlier, supra note 4, at 5.
62. In contrast to the approaches of intergovernmental structures, the repre-
sentative institutions such as The Council of Europe, the European Parlia-
ment and their various committees, have reflected a more liberal and
humanitarian attitude in their debates, motions, and reports, and have tried
to promote a more sympathetic policy towards refugees and asylum seekers.
Kaye, supra note 20, at 57. Accord Carlier, supra note 4, at 4.
63. Harmonization of eligibility practice under the 1951 Geneva Convention on
the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, Rec. 787 (1976) (adopted by the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Sept. 16, 1976).
64. Recommendation on the Harmonization of National Procedures relating to
Asylum, Council of Europe Rec. No. R(81)16 (1981).
65. Refugee issues have been considered in a number of committees, including
the Political Affairs Committee and the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens'
Rights. JoLY & N=rLEzrON, supra note 8, at 20. Of particular note during this era is
the 1987 report of the latter committee prepared by Oskar Vetter which
contained extensive recommendations which focus on rights for refugees and
asylum-seekers, the expeditious treatment of their cases, and avoidance of
the use of deterrence measures. It also called on the European Commission
to facilitate burden-sharing and to underwrite the work of government and
non-government agencies through its budget.
Loescher, supra note 1, at 630. A 1985 White Paper on the completion of the internal
market foreshadowed a European Commission directive on the right to asylum.
Kaye, supra note 20, at 56.
66. Resolutions of Mar. 12, 1987, O.J. No. C.099, 13.4.1987, at 167; June 18,
1987, O.J. No. C.190, 20.7.87, at 105; and of Mar. 15, 1990, O.J. No. C.096,
17.4.1990, at 274. "These initiatives have had little significant effect because govern-
ments have maintained, under the Treaty of Rome, that the Commission (which has
shown more flexibility and liberality than its political masters) and the European Par-
liament, had no competence to deal with asylum and immigration matters." Kaye,
supra note 20, at 57. See also Loescher, supra note 1, at 631; Weckel, supra note 37, at
433-34.
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achieved by the governments' own informal mechanisms. The Euro-
pean Commission in 1988 "decided not to oppose the intergovernmen-
tal approach,"' 67 for which it was rewarded by being allowed to
participate in the private deliberations among states.
In the result, the two supranational authorities have been effectively
excluded from the elaboration of a common asylum law for Europe.6
8
The European Parliament has since passed a series of resolutions in
which it effectively pleads to be re-admitted to the inner circle of deci-
sion-making, 69 and has sponsored reports on the harmonization of asy-
lum policy by its constituent committees. 70 For its part, the Council of
Europe has attempted to win back the favor of states by drafting mecha-
nisms to exclude the citizens of "safe countries" from the refugee deter-
mination process,7 ' and by explicitly recognizing the importance of
humanitarian mechanisms to stem the flow of migrants to Europe. 72
Neither body is, however, likely to succeed in convincing states to relin-
quish control over asylum policy. 73 National authorities have instead
embraced the informal intergovernmental approach to lawmaking 74 as
ideally suited to their interests.
75
67. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 12, at 9.
68. It has been observed that "the institutions of the Council function as lobbyists
attempting to influence national governments and community institutions." JOINT
COMMFITEE FOR THE WELFARE OF IMMIGRANTS, Unequal Migrants: The European
Community's Unequal Treatment of Migrants and Refugees 37 (1989). "The Euro-
pean Parliament was kept completely out of the Schengen negotiations, although it
was 'informed' about the drafting of the Dublin Convention." Egan & Storey, supra
note 10, at 59.
69. See, e.g., European Parliament Resolutions of Mar. 15, 1989, O.J. No. C96,
17.04.1989, at 57; Nov. 23, 1989, O.J. No. C323, 27.12.1989, at 98; Mar. 15, 1990,
O.J. No. C96, 17.04.1990, at 274;June 14, 1990, OJ. No. C175, 16.07.1990, at 170;
Feb. 22, 1991, OJ. No. C72, 18.03.1991, at 213; Sept. 13, 1991, O.J. No. C267,
14.10.1991, at 197; and of Apr. 7, 1992, P.E. 160.902, at 48.
70. Report of the Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights on Freedom of
Movement for Persons and Problems Relating to National Security in the Commu-
nity, EUR. PARL. Doc. A3-0199/91, 2.7.1991; and Report of the Committee on Civil
Liberties and Internal Affairs on the Harmonisation within the European Communi-
ties of Asylum Law and Policies, EUR. PARL. Doc. A3-0337/92/Part B, 5.11.1992.
71. Cf Amnesty International, supra note 47, at 16.
72. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Res. 1149 (1991).
73. "In the mid-1980s governments came to the conclusion that they needed to
harmonize their asylum policy but their proposals are not in accordance with the
Council of Europe guidelines. On the contrary, the main thrust of their discussions
concentrates on measures to reduce the number of asylum-seekers and refugees in
Europe at almost any cost." JoLy & NErrLETON, supra note 8, at 19.
74. "The moves towards the single internal market from 1987 have.., had con-
siderable bearing on refugee and asylum policy. The Commission's plans for the
completion of the internal market included a proposal for a directive to coordinate
provisions for the right of asylum and refugee status in the EC. At the end of 1988,
the EC Council of Ministers decided not to continue work on the Commission's draft
directive, and instead adopted an intergovernmental approach." Kaye, supra note 20,
at 56.
75. "The nation initially exercises its sovereignty by committing the country to a
general will, but retains voting rights to determine the policy of the association of
nations. While relinquishing its absolute sovereignty to determine an independent
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The first of two key sets of intergovernmental institutions which
have addressed refugee issues is the Trevi ("Terrorism, Radicalism,
Extremism, Violence International") Group,76 constituted in the mid-
1970s to allow the immigration and justice ministers of EC states to
coordinate policy on security matters.7 7 In 1986, the Trevi Group
established the more specialized Ad Hoc Group Immigration to enable
immigration ministers and officials to address concerns associated with
the plan to end internal border controls, including the risks associated
with refugee protection. 7 8 A sub-committee of the Ad Hoc Group has
produced three major accords: the 1990 Dublin Convention on respon-
sibility to examine asylum requests, 79 which, as previously observed,
denies refugees the right to choose the country in which they will seek
asylum without setting any standards for procedural or substantive coor-
dination; a "parallel convention," approved in principle in June of 1992
by EC immigration ministers, and intended to allow non-EC states to
accede to the regime;8 0 and a draft Convention on the Crossing of
External Borders which deals with such matters as mandatory external
border controls, unified visa requirements, and the sanctioning of carri-
ers which transport passengers without proper documents. 8 1 While the
latter accord pays lip service to the legal rights of refugees, it contains
no specific exemptions in fact to address the needs of genuine asylum-
seekers.8 2
course of action, the nation joins an association of nations in order to achieve a more
secure and profitable existence." Whitaker, supra note 5, at 194.
76. "The original task of the [Trevi] Group was to examine issues of terrorism
and international violence, and the inclusion of immigration within its responsibili-
ties reveals a dubious association of ideas i.e., migrant/refugee = suspect person =
potential terrorist." 16 NoRTH/SourT- IssuEs 2 (1992).
77. "The ministers wanted to co-operate more closely in fighting terrorism, inter-
national crime, drug trafficking and such like activities. They quickly established a
working group to discuss and try out measures aimed at preventing the abuse of
asylum rights." Casey, supra note 45, at 49. See generally Loescher, supra note 1, at
630.
78. "The ad hoc group is a purely inter-governmental body.., unsullied by any
contact with the Commission, the European Parliament, or indeed national parlia-
ments, let alone the wretched media. Meeting behind closed doors, it has-perhaps
not surprisingly,-drawn up a policy for closing the doors of Europe on as many
refugees as possible." Mortimer, supra note 9, at 21.
79. Widgren, supra note 3, at 763. This accord has been signed by all twelve EC
states, but has thus far been ratified by only Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, Portu-
gal, and the United Kingdom.
80. Avant projet de convention parall61e f la Convention de Dublin du 15 juin
1990, Doc. SN 1729/2/92 (WGI 1008, Rev. 2), May 8, 1992. See also Amnesty Inter-
national, supra note 47, at 4. This would be of particular interest to the states of the
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), as well as to Australia, Canada, and the
United States which have met regularly with their EC partners since 1985 to discuss
"shared responsibility" under the auspices of the "Informal Consultations." See gen-
erally Widgren, supra note 3, at 763.
81. Supra note 36. See generally INTERNATIONAL LAw AsSOCIATION, supra note 41, at
19-20;JoLy & NETrLETON, supra note 8, at 20; Egan & Storey, supra note 10, at 58.
82. For example, the proposed Article 2(2), which requires states to impose a
sanction on persons "crossing external borders at any point other than authorized
crossing points," appears to conflict with Article 31 of the Refugee Convention,
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The projects elaborated within the Trevi process are modelled on
the work of a subset of EC states, known as the Schengen Group.8 3 Ini-
tial parties included Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain have since been allowed
to join.8 4 Meeting regularly since 1985, this informal group of states
embraces the "fast track" approach to European integration, 5 in which
the right to asylum is perceived as an irritant to be constrained to the
maximum.8 6 The 1985 and 1990 Schengen Agreements are expected to
be fully implemented during 1993,87 at which time this group of EC
countries will "become a testing ground for the EC's own drive to give
its citizens free movement across borders."8 8 The governance of the
Schengen system, including authority over visa policy, is vested in an
intergovernmental Executive Committee which operates completely
outside the constraints of domestic or supranational law.8 9
which prohibits the imposition of penalties on refugees "on account of their illegal
entry or presence" provided they present themselves without delay to authorities.
While this conflict arguably is resolved by Article 27, which mandates that the pro-
posed Convention applies "subject to" the Refugee Convention and Protocol, it is
difficult to see how the conflict between generic visa requirements and the refugee's
right to seek asylum can be resolved.
83. See generally Steenbergen, supra note 32, at 61; Weckel, supra note 37, at 426;
Loescher, supra note 1, at 629.
84. The Schengen Central Negotiation Group "has abandoned hopes that Italy,
Spain and Portugal would, at the initial stage, be part of the Schengen Area without
internal frontiers" since the requirement of Article 140 of the Supplementary Agree-
ment that each founding member of the Group approve new accessions is far from
being met, particularly in France and Germany. Schengen Area Without Internal Borders
is Still Far From Being Accomplished, MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, Sept. 1992.
85. "It has.., become clear that if the EC cannot get final agreement among the
Twelve on the remaining issues, then the Schengen group will become the 'fast track'
for European integration, while others, presumably like the UK, Denmark, and
Greece, will be in the slower track." Kaye, supra note 20, at 57. "This will be a new
iron ring, dividing one part of the EC from the rest." John Carvel, Please Have Your
Passports Ready.... THE GUARDIAN, July 22, 1992, at 23.
86. "The Schengen agreement displays no concern for the human rights of the
refugees and asylum-seekers. Economic alignment is the priority. The problem of
asylum-seekers and refugees represents a technical hitch which needs to be elimi-
nated." Casey, supra note 45, at 51. Accord Weckel, supra note 37, at 414: "II faut
constater ... une difference sensible d'appr~ciation entre les membres du groupe
Schengen et la Commission des Communaut~s europ~enes. Celle-ci avait fix6
l'objectif de parvenir 1 une harmonisation du droit d'asile, ambition qui ne semble
pas vraiment partag~e par les signataires de l'accord a six."
87. EC/Schengen: Greece Becomes Ninth Member, AGENCE EUROPE, Nov. 6, 1992.
88. Italy Expected to Sign European Free Travel Agreement, REUTER LIBR, REP., Oct 16,
1990, quoted in Whitaker, supra note 5, at 193, n.12. Indeed, it is reported that Czech-
oslovakia, Hungary, and Poland have modelled their new immigration agreement on
the Schengen Agreement. Whitake, supra note 5, at 222.
89. An important role is reserved for the Executive Committee in the visa
policy .... [Tihere is no legal remedy against the refusal to grant a visa. The
national judge is in general not empowered to examine decisions taken by
international organs and the 1990 Schengen Convention does not make pro-
vision for any remedy either.
Steenbergen, supra note 32, at 68-69. See also Whitaker, supra note 5, at 203-12.
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The advantages of an intergovernmental approach for states com-
mitted to deterrence are clear. Because critical decisions have been
taken within an international body and codified in international agree-
ments, governments have not had to contend with the vagaries of a
domestic policy debate.90 Yet by avoiding the supranational fora of the
Council of Europe and European Community, it has proved possible to
achieve the coordination of immigration policy without any formal
renunciation of domestic jurisdiction91 or submission to substantive
scrutiny and procedural accountability. 92 There has thus been no
imperative to engage in the balancing of communal closure and the
human rights of coerced migrants that an open and principled reform of
refugee law would have required.93
There are belated and tentative signs that this undemocratic mode
of decision-making may be challenged. In ultimately agreeing to the rat-
ification of the 1990 Schengen Agreement, for example, the Dutch Par-
liament reserved to itself the right to approve or reject any decision of
the Executive Committee of Schengen. 94 The Belgian Conseil d'Etat
has since declared its concerns regarding the legality of the Schengen
Agreement.95 As well, the beleaguered Maastricht Treaty on European
Unity-even though it retains the invidious association of asylum with
issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, and international crime-would
nonetheless allow a coordinated common visa policy to be set by the EC
with the involvement of the European Parliament,96 and requires that a
90. "If the policy decision remains at the national level, the government faces a
battle, with possible election consequences. It can also be very difficult to muster the
majority necessary to change national immigration or asylum law." Whitaker, supra
note 5, at 216.
91. "Si l'id6e maitresse a bien 6t6 de responsabiliser chaque Etat, il convient
d'admettre que le maintien de l'autonomie dans l'exercise de la comp&ence a 6t6
voulu comme un corrolaire de la d61imitation de la responsabilitE." Weckel, supra
note 37, at 415-16.
92. "From a democratic and legal point of view, Community regulation is highly
preferable to intergovernmental arrangements." INTERNATIONAL LAw AssocIATION,
supra note 41, at 17. Indeed, it would appear that "[t]he use of inter-governmental
arrangements, rather than the formal institutions of the EC itself, represents a delib-
erate decision to avoid scrutiny by EC bodies and accountability under EC law."
Egan & Storey, supra note 10, at 57. See also Amnesty International, supra note 30, at
2.
93. "La circonscription, le pragmatisme et le souci d'efficacit6 ont incit6 les
r6dacteurs de la Convention de Schengen i 6viter les formules de principe evoquant
les objectifs g6n6raux i atteindre." Weckel, supra note 37, at 426. This avoidance of
questions of principle is highly problematic as "... there are clearly inherent limits to
the treatment democratic societies can mete out to foreigners if they are to honour
their humanitarian commitments towards genuine refugees." B6hning, supra note 6,
at 455.
94. Les d6put6s et s6nateurs n6erlandais ont obtenu un droit de veto sur
l'application des accords de Schengen, LE MONDE, June 25, 1992.
95. MIGRATION NEWS SHEET, supra note 84, at 1.
96. Article 100(c) provides that decisions on a common visa policy will initially
require unanimity, except in emergency situations in which cases a maximum six
month visa requirement may be enacted by qualified majority vote. From 1996
onward, all decisions on visa requirements will be made by qualified majority vote.
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process be set in motion to examine EC assumption ofjurisdiction over
asylum more generally. 9 7 There is a risk, however, that the momentum
generated by the Trevi and Schengen schemes is simply too great to be
redirected,98 and that the unaccountable9 9 intergovernmental model
may be here to stay.' 00
IV. Implications
What are the lessons of this European experience? First, that increasing
levels of economic integration lead logically towards a policy of genera-
lized freedom of movement within the economic zone, which in turn will
require some coordination of strategy regarding external frontiers. Sec-
ond, that the self-interested drive towards unification presents states
with an opportunity to reconceptualize refugee flows as irritants to coor-
dination, and to pursue with impunity generalized policies of deter-
rence. Third, that the intergovernmental structures requisite to detailed
alignment of economic policy can be used in order to shield protection-
ist lawmaking from scrutiny or review, allowing the human rights man-
date of refugee law to be effectively undercut. Finally, and most
97. The Deal is Done, THE EcONoMisT, Dec. 14, 1991, at 51-54. See generally Carlier,
supra note 4, at 4-5; Egan & Storey, supra note 10, at 60-61. While Article K.1 defines
asylum policy to be a matter of common interest, Article K.4 maintains the intergov-
ernmental coordination approach subject to the possibility set out in Article K.3 for
future agreement on an expanded EC role in regard to asylum. A Declaration
attached to the Treaty notes the agreement of states to seek enhanced harmonization
of asylum policy before the end of 1993.
98. "Tout donne i penser que cette structure d'action, cr6e dans la perspective
de la r~alisation du march6 int~rieur, continuera de fonctionner durablement, forte
de la solidarit6 particulire qui unit les six membres fondateurs de la Communaut6."
Weckel, supra note 37, at 434. For example, in February 1993, Germany agreed to
pay Poland and the Czech Republic DM 55 million to strengthen border guards, con-
struct transit camps and refugee facilities, and pay for the onward deportation of
rejected asylum-seekers to their country of origin. Michael Binyon, Poles Promised
Immigration Cash, THE TIMES OF LONDON, Feb. 9, 1993. Moreover, 35 European inte-
rior ministers meeting in Budapest recently agreed to standardize border control
procedures, and to establish an inter-governmental work group to draft a treaty on
returning illegal migrants. E. Varadi, European Countries Agree on Ways to Hall Illegal
Migration, REUTER, Feb. 16, 1993.
99. Title VI, 'provisions on co-operation in the fields of justice and home
affairs' ... is one of the two 'pillars' of the proposed union which the British
government is so pleased to have kept separate from the EC proper: an
inter-governmental affair, in which national sovereignty will be preserved
.... It means, in reality, that ministers reckon to decide these matters among
themselves without the intrusion of public scrutiny or debate.
Mortimer, supra note 9, at 21.
100. "These provisions of the Maastricht Treaty . . . do not formally propose a
significant extension of official EC competence .... [C]oordination is to remain pri-
marily at intergovernmental level, and policy can hence continue to be relatively
secretive and unaccountable." 18 North/South Issues 3 (1992). It is noteworthy that
both the "Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining Applica-
tions for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communi-
ties" ("Dublin Convention") [Art. 18] and the draft "Convention of the Member
States of the European Communities on the Crossing of their External Borders"
(Art. 26] adopts the intergovernmental supervisory approach.
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profoundly, the experience to date shows that the basic commitment to
balance domestic self-interest with the human rights of those forced to
flee in search of protection is now extraordinarily fragile, even in the
very states which crafted the modern international human rights and ref-
ugee regimes. 10 '
101. "Considered in the light of the former more hospitable attitude towards asy-
lum seekers, the fact that the idea of individual human rights originated in Western
Europe appears now as somewhat ironic. The European 'Enlightenment' produced
the related ideas of human rights, separation of powers and the rule of law as the
main elements of the modern-constitutional-State. Recognition of-universal-
human rights implies in principle also hospitality to asylum seekers." INTERNATIONAL
LAW AsSOCIATION, supra note 41, at 3.

